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Abstract
We introduce a concept of optimal transport for vector-valued measures and its dual formulation. In
this note we concentrate on the semi-discrete case and show some fundamental differences between
the scalar and vector cases. A manifestation of this difference is the possibility of non-existence of
optimal solution for the dual problem for feasible primer problems.
1 Introduction
There are n agents sharing a cake of q layers (possibly of different widths). Each agent demands a
given amount of each of the components. Assume the demands are all feasible (i.e. the sum of the
demands for each component by all agents does not exceed the total amount of this component).
Can we split the cake vertically (i.e.without separating the layers) such that each agent will get his
precise demand? If such a sub-partition is possible, in how many ways can it be done?
Assume further that the cost of production and delivery of each part of the cake depends on
the consuming agent (say, some agents demand a better quality and/or the the cost of delivery for
some agents is higher than for others). Can the market determine an equilibrium price that the
baker may charge for each component for each agent, in a way that will supply the agents’ demand?
In the semi-discrete setting we adopt, the number of agents and layers are finite but the cake
itself is a continuum. If the number of components (layers) of the cake is one then this is a special
case of optimal transport (Monge-Kantorovich) theory (see, e.g. [15, 17, 18]). In optimal transport
both the cake and agents can be continuum, but there is only a single layer. In the single-layer semi
discrete setting the first question is trivial since any feasible demand can always be satisfied, and,
in general, there are infinity many ways to do it. It is less trivial but still true that an equilibrium
price can also be determined for each agent in that case.
The problem is much less trivial in the multi-layer case. In this note we will characterize the
demands that can be supplied and the pricing strategy in this case, and will touch on some other
issues related to multi-layer optimal transport
2 The single layer
Let (X, d, µ) be a compact metric measure space (the ”cake”) and B the Borel sigma-algebra over
X. The Radon measure µ : B → R+ is assumed to contain no atoms, in particular 0 < µ(X) <∞
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and for any m ∈ (0, µ(X)) there are sets A,A
′
∈ B (in fact, infinitely many such sets) for which
µ(A) = µ(A
′
) = m and µ(A∆A
′
) > 0 (∆ stands for the symmetric difference). A sub-partition of
X corresponding to ~m = (m1, . . . mn) ∈ R
n
+ (the ”demands”) is composed of n essential disjoint
sets A1, . . . An ∈ B such that
µ(Ai) = mi and µ(Ai ∩Ak) = 0 for i 6= k .
We identify two sub-partitions ~A := (A1 . . . An), ~A
′
:= (A
′
1 . . . A
′
n) if µ(Ai∆A
′
i) = 0 for i = 1 . . . n.
Determine the set of all these sub-partitions by ~A(µ, ~m). Evidently, there exists infinity many
sub-partitions in ~A(µ, ~m) if |~m| :=
∑n
1 mi ≤ µ(X) and non if |~m| > µ(X).
Let ~c := (c1 . . . cn) : X → R
n
+ be a continuous cost function. A stable sub-partition is a sub-
partition ~A := (A1, . . . An) ∈ ~A(µ, ~m) which minimizes
Mo( ~A) :=
n∑
i=1
∫
Ai
cidµ (1)
over all ~A ∈ ~A(µ, ~m).
The components ci(x) of ~c at x ∈ X are the ”cost of production” of x for i. Let pi ∈ R be the
price of purchase per unit of agent i [8]. The net profit of the ”baker” for selling x to agent i is
pi − ci(x). It is assumed that the baker will not sell x to i unless both conditions hold: The profit
is positive and he cannot increase it by selling it to another agent. Thus, a necessary condition for
x to be sold to agent i is
pi − ci(x) = max{0, pk − ck(x); k = {1 . . . n}} := −φ(x, ~p) . (2)
The price vector ~p = (p1 . . . pn) is called an equilibrium price for the sub-partition ~A = (A1, . . . An)
if
Ai ⊆ {x; pi − ci(x) = −φ(x, ~p)}
for any i ∈ {1 . . . n}. It can easily be verified that a sub-partition ~A ∈ ~A(µ, ~m) is stable for given
cost if there exists an equilibrium price vector for this sub-partition.
The semi-discrete case is a special case of the celebrated optimal transport problem. In gen-
eral, the problem of optimal transport (Monge-Kantorovich) refers to a pair of measure spaces
(X,µ), (Y, ν) where µ(X) = ν(Y ), and c : X×Y → R is a given cost function. The Monge problem
[14] is the minimization of the functional
Mo(T ) =
∫
X
c(x, T (x))µ(dx)
over all measurable T : X → Y which satisfies the condition T#µ = ν, namely µ(T
−1(B)) = ν(B)
for any measurable set B ⊂ Y . The Kantorovich relaxation reduces the Monge problem to infinite-
dimensional linear programming:
Kantorovich problem: [9] Minimize
K(π) :=
∫
X
∫
Y
c(x, y)π(dxdy) (3)
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over π ∈ Π(µ, ν) where
Π(µ, ν) :=
{
π is a positive measure on X × Y,
∫
X
π(dxdy) = ν(dy),
∫
Y
π(dxdy) = µ(dx)
}
(4)
Under mild conditions the minimizer of the Kantorovich problem always exists, and [4, 3]
min
π∈Π(µ,ν)
K(π) = inf
T#µ=ν
Mo(T ) .
The problem of equilibrium prices is related to the Kantorovich duality Theorem.
Kantorovich Duality Theorem[16]:
min
π∈Π(µ,ν)
K(π) = sup
(φ,ψ)∈J(c)
∫
X
φdµ+
∫
Y
ψdν (5)
where
J(c) := {φ ∈ C(X), ψ ∈ C(Y );ψ(x) + φ(y) ≤ c(x, y) ∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y } . (6)
In the semi discrete case (1) Y is a finite set (Y = {0, 1, . . . n}), ν({i}) = mi, i = 1 . . . n,
ν({0}) = µ(X) − |~m| and c(x, i) = ci(x), c0(x) ≡ 0. An optimal sub-partition corresponds to the
solution of the Monge problem T via Ai = T
−1({i}) where i ∈ {1 . . . n}.
The existence of such an optimal mapping T is not evident in the general case, but there
always exists an optimal sub-partition in the semi-discrete case [21]. The equilibrium price for the
semi-discrete case corresponds to the optimal function ψ in the dual problem, which, in this case
(Y = {0, 1 . . . n}), is just a ”price vector” ~p = (p1, . . . pn) ∈ R
n where p0 (price of the ”null agent”)
is set to zero. Thus
∫
Y
ψdν ≡ ~p · ~m. The optimal function φ maximizing the right side of (5) for a
given ψ = ~p subject to the constraint (6) is given by (2). In the semi-discrete case the Kantorovich
duality Theorem takes the form
inf
~A∈ ~A(µ,~m)
Mo( ~A) = sup
~p∈Rn
~p · ~m−
∫
X
φ(x, ~p)µ(dx) . (7)
Theorem [20, 21]: If |~m| ≤ µ(X) and µ is non-atomic then there exists a stable sub-partition
~A ∈ ~A(µ, ~m) minimizing the left side of (7), and an equilibrium price vector ~p for this sub-partition
maximizing the right side of (7). If, moreover,
µ(x ∈ X; ci(x)− ck(x) = λ) = 0
for any i 6= k ∈ {1 . . . n} and any λ ∈ R, then there exists a unique stable sub-partition for each ~m
in the simplex |~m| ≤ µ(X).
3 Semi discrete optimal transport in the Multi-layer case
Let ~µ := (µ1 . . . µq) be a vector of non-negative Radon measures on B (the layers), such that
µ =
∑q
1 µ
j is atoms-free.
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Problem 1. Given n× q matrix M = {mji} such that m
j
i ≥ 0. Is there a sub-partition of X into
n pairwise essentially disjoint sets Ai ∈ B such that µ
j(Ai) = m
j
i?
Evidently, a necessary condition is the feasibility
n∑
i=1
mji ≤ µ
j(X) ∀j ∈ {1 . . . q} . (8)
Let M(n, ~µ) be the set of all n× q matrices M for which such a sub-partition exists.
Note that the case q = 1 is trivial, as M(n, ~µ) is just the simplex of vectors ~m ∈ Rn+, {|~m| ≤
µ(X)} and (8) is also a sufficient condition for M to be in M(n, ~µ).
Problem 2. Is there M ∈ M(n, ~µ) for which there is a unique sub-partition A1, . . . An ∈ B such
that µj(Ai) = m
j
i?
Let ζj := dµ
j/dµ be the relative density of µj (in particular
∑q
1 ζj(x) = 1 µ-a.s). Let
~ζ :=
(ζ1, . . . ζq). Let ci(x) be continuous functions on X (the ”cost of production” of x for agent i ∈
{1 . . . n}). Let the following ”generic” assumptions
i ζj are continuous on X for any j ∈ {1 . . . q}.
ii For any ~λ ∈ Rq, ~λ 6= 0, µ(x ∈ X;~λ · ~ζ(x) = 0) = 0.
iii For any ~λ ∈ Rq and any i 6= k ∈ {1 . . . n}, µ(x ∈ X;~λ · ~ζ(x) = ci(x)− ck(x)) = 0
Let P := {pji} be the price of component j charged from agent i. The net income associated with
x ∈ X out of agent i after deducing the cost is, then
∑q
j=1 p
j
i ζj(x) − ci(x). This determines a
sub-partition by assigning x ∈ X to the agent i which maximizes the net income for the ”baker”:
Ai(P) :=

x ∈ X;
q∑
j=1
pji ζj(x)− ci(x) = φ(x;P)

 (9)
where
φ(x;P) :=

 max
k∈{1...n}
q∑
j=1
pjkζj(x)− ck(x)


+
.
By Assumption [iii] above we obtain that, indeed, {Ai(P)}i=1...n is a sub-partition satisfying
µ (Ai(P) ∩Ak(P)) = 0 for i 6= k and ∪
n
i=1 Ai(P) ⊂ X
where the last inclusion can be strict.
Definition 1. The price matrix P is an equilibrium price for the demand M := {mji} ∈M(n, ~µ) if
the corresponding sub-partition satisfies the demand, namely µj(Ai(P)) = m
j
i for each i ∈ {1 . . . n}
and j ∈ {1 . . . q}.
The next question we ask is
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Problem 3. Let M∈M(n, ~µ) and a continuous cost ~c = (c1 . . . cn) on X satisfying condition [iii].
Is there always an equilibrium price P?
It turns that the answer to Problem 3 is related to Problem 2.
In the case of a single layer (q = 1) and at least two agents then the answer is (trivially) No
to Problem 2 and Yes to Problem 3. For q > 1 we will show that the answer to Problem 2 is
(surprisingly) Yes, which, in turn, implies an example of non existence of equilibrium price (that is
No for Problem 3).
4 Main results
The first result follows from Lyapunov’s theorem for vector measures [11] (see also [1, 10])
Theorem[Lyapunov]: The set {~µ(E); E ∈ B} is convex in Rq.
An immediate characterization of M(n, ~µ) follows from Lyapunov’s theorem:
Proposition 1. Let Pi, i = 1, . . . n be the projection of the n × q matrices on the i row. Then
PiM(n, ~µ) is a convex subset in R
q
+.
There is, however, a stronger result:
Theorem [22]: The set M(n, ~µ) is convex in the space of n× q matrices.
We now address Problem 2.
Let P := {~p1, . . . ~pn}, ~pi ∈ R
q for i = 1 . . . n be an R-valued n× q matrix. For each such matrix
define the n−sub-partition ~A0(P) corresponding to (9) above where ~c = 0, namely
A0i (P) :=
{
x ∈ X; ~pi · ~ζ =
[
max
k=1...q
~pk · ~ζ(x)
]
+
}
, i = 1 . . . n .
It follows from assumptions [i,ii] that µ
(
A0i (P) ∩A
0
k(P)
)
= 0 if ~pi 6= ~pk. In particular, A
0
1(P), . . . A
0
n(P)
is an essentially disjoint sub-partition if
~pi 6= ~pk for any 1 ≤ i 6= k ≤ n . (10)
Let M(P) := {mji (P)} = {µ
j(A0i (P))}.
Theorem 1. Under condition (10), if B1, . . . Bn is a sub-partition corresponding to M(P), then
µ(Bi∆A
0
i (P)) = 0.
Proof. Assume B1, . . . Bn is a sub-partition satisfying µ
j(Bi) = µ
j(A0i (P)). Then, by definition
0 =
∫
X
[
max
i∈{1...n}
~pi · ~ζ(x)
]
+
µ(dx)−
n∑
i=1
~pi · ~mi
where ~mi := (m
1
i (P), . . . m
q
i (P)) ∈ R
q. On the other hand
∫
X
[
max
i∈{1...n}
~pi · ~ζ(x)
]
+
µ(dx) ≥
n∑
i=1
∫
Bi
~pi · ζ(x)µ(dx) +
∫
B0
[
max
i∈{1...n}
~pi · ~ζ(x)
]
+
µ(dx)
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where B0 := X − ∪
n
i Bi. Since µ
j(Bi) = m
j
i by assumption we get
n∑
i=1
∫
Bi
~pi · ζ(x)µ(dx) =
n∑
i=1
~pi · ~mi .
It follows that ∫
B0
[
max
i∈{1...n}
~pi · ~ζ(x)
]
+
µ(dx) ≤ 0
and all inequalities above are, in fact, equalities. In particular, the last equality implies that ~pi·~ζ ≤ 0
µ−a.e on B0, so B0 ∩ (∪
n
1A
0
i (P)) = ∅. Moreover∫
Bi
([
max
k∈{1...n}
~pk · ~ζ(x)
]
+
− ~pi · ~ζ(x)
)
µ(dx) = 0
so
[
maxk∈{1...n} ~pk · ~ζ(x)
]
+
= ~pi · ~ζ(x) µ-a.e on Bi for i > 0. This implies that Bi is essentially
contained in A0i (P) i.e µ(Bi − A
0
i (P)) = 0). Since ∪
n
i=0Bi = X by definition, we obtain the
proof.
Answer to problem 3:
Theorem 2. Assume i,ii. There exists ~c ∈ C(X,Rn) and M ∈ M(n, ~µ) for which there is no
equilibrium prise corresponding to ~c,M.
Proof. We introduce an example of a cost function ~c ∈ C(X,Rn) satisfying iii for which an equilib-
rium price does not exist forM =M(P) where P satisfies (10). Since, by Theorem 1, ~A0(P) is the
a unique sub-partition (up to µ-negligible sets), any equilibrium price P
′
for M(P) must satisfy
A0i (P) = Ai(P
′
) , i = 1 . . . n (11)
up to µ−negligible set, where ~A(P
′
) given by (9) for P
′
substituted for P. By definition
A0i (P) ∩A
0
k(P) ⊂ {x ∈ X; (~pi − ~pk) ·
~ζ(x) = 0} .
Let such i, k for which A0i (P) ∩ A
0
k(P) contains q + 1 distinct points x1, . . . xq+1. Let V ⊂ R
q+1
be the subspace spanned by {(~t · ~ζ(x1), . . . ~t · ~ζ(xp+1))) ;~t ∈ R
q}. Since dim(V ) ≤ q it follows
that there exists a vector ~w ∈ Rq+1, ~w 6∈ V . We now choose the components ck, ci of ~c such that
((ci(x1)− ck(x1)), . . . (ci(xq+1)− ck(xq+1)) = ~w.
It follows that for the row vectors ~p′ i,
~p′k in P
′
there exists xl, 1 ≤ l ≤ q + 1, for which
~p
′
i ·
~ζ(xl) + ci(xl) 6= ~p
′
k ·
~ζ(xl) + ck(xl)
i.e. xl 6∈ Ai(P
′
) ∩Ak(P
′
). This contradicts (11).
5 Generalization to multi-layer transport
The definition of M(n, ~µ) leads to a family of partial orders on the set of Rq valued measures on
measure spaces.
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Definition 2. Consider the set of Rq valued measure spaces X . Given n ∈ N, for (X, ~µ), (Y, ~ν) ∈ X
define
(X, ~µ) ≻n (Y, ~ν) iff M(n, ~µ) ⊃M(n, ~ν) .
Equivalently, for any n−sub-partition ~B of Y there exists an n−sub-partition ~A of X such that
νj(Bi) = µ
j(Ai) for i ∈ {1 . . . n} and j ∈ {1 . . . q}.
It can easily be verified that ≻n is a partial order relation for each n. In particular, a necessary
condition for (X, ~µ) ≻n (Y, ~ν) is, by (8) ~µ(X) ≥ ~ν(Y ) coordinatewise (namely µ
j(X) ≥ νj(Y ) for
j = 1 . . . q).
In addition, this partial order is preserved under weak* convergence:
lim
k→∞
(~µk,X) = (~µ,X)⇐⇒ lim
k→∞
∫
~ψ · d~µk =
∫
~ψ · d~µ
for any ψ ∈ C(X;Rq).
Proposition [2]: If (~µk,X) ≻n (~νk, Y ) for any k ∈ N and limk→∞(~µk,X) = (~µ,X), limk→∞(~νk, Y ) =
(~ν, Y ) then
(X, ~µ) ≻n (Y, ~ν) .
Note also that ≻n⊃≻n+1. As a result we can define the partial order
≻:= ∩∞n=1 ≻n (12)
which is preserved under weak* convergence as well. This object is in some context related to
convex or stochastic order, as well as to dominance and majorization of probability distributions
(c.f. [7, 5, 6, 12, 13]).
Theorem [2]: The following are equivalent:
• (~µ,X) ≻ (Y, ~ν).
• There exists a measurable kernel Px(dy) such that
∫
Y
Px(dy) = 1 µ−as in x and∫
X
Px(dy)µ
j(dx) = νj(dy) , j = 1 . . . q .
• For any non-negative convex function f on Rq+∫
X
f
(
d~µ
dµ
)
dµ ≥
∫
Y
f
(
d~ν
dν
)
dν
• For any k ∈ N and any k− sub-partition B1, . . . Bk of Y there is a k−sub-partition A1 . . . Ak
of X, such that
∫
Ai
dµj =
∫
Bi
dνj for i = 1 . . . k and j = 1 . . . q.
The generalization of the Kantorovich problem for q-layer case is as follows: Given a pair of
R
q− valued measures (X, ~µ) ≻ (Y, ~ν), minimize (3) on π ∈ Π(~µ, ~ν) where
Π(~µ, ~ν) :=
{
π ∈ K(µ, ν) ,
∫
X
d~µ
dµ
(dx)π(dxdy) = ~ν(dy)
}
.
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The corresponding duality theorem is given in [2]:
Theorem
min
π∈Π(~µ,~ν)
∫
X×Y
c(x, y)π(dxdy) = sup
(~φ,~ψ)∈Jq(c)
∫
X
~φ · d~µ +
∫
Y
~ψ · d~ν
where
Jq(c) :=
{
~φ ∈ Cq(X), ~ψ ∈ Cq(Y );
d~µ
dµ
·
(
~ψ(x) + ~φ(y)
)
≤ c(x, y) ∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y
}
.
The manuscript [2] also extend the the partial order (12) and the duality Theorem to Banach-valued
measures.
In view of Theorem 2, the existence of a maximizer to the dual problem is not guaranteed, in
general. The following question is still open:
Question: What is the conditions on c = c(x, y), (~µ,X), (~ν, Y ) under which a maximizer to the
dual problem exists in the Banach (or even the finite dimensional vector) valued case?
There is a relevant result in this direction:
Theorem [22]: Consider the semi-discrete case. If M is a relative interior point of M(n, ~µ) then
there is a maximizer of the dual problem in the finite dimensional vector valued case:
sup
P
Tr(PM)−
∫
X
φ(x;P)dµ .
If assumption i-iii are satisfied than the maximum is unique.
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